Dalhousie Law Journal
Volume 1

Issue 2

Article 5

12-1-1973

The Civil Law of Quebec: Some Disjointed Notes for a Lecture
G. V. V. Nicholls

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj
Part of the Civil Law Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
G. V. V. Nicholls, “The Civil Law of Quebec: Some Disjointed Notes for a Lecture”, Notes, (1973-1974) 1:2
DLJ 336.

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

Notes and Comments
The Civil Law of Quebec: Some
Disjointed Notes for a Lecture

G. V. V. Nicholls, Q.C.*

Quebec private law, though not the public law, can be regarded
as a reasonably characteristic example of that system of law
known as the Civil Law, one of the world's great legal systems;
and you live in the province of Prince Edward Island and I of
Nova Scotia, where another of the world's great systems
flourishes, the Common Law - you will notice that I say
"another", not "the other". It is right and proper that we
should attempt to familiarize ourselves with at least one other
system of law besides our own, not necessarily with the detailed
rules, which may or may not differ from ours, but with the
approach of that other system to human problems, its method.
For there is no better avenue to improved knowledge of other
peoples than through their law, and no one can deny that a
better understanding of French Canada in other parts of our
country is badly needed.
Before I attempt to say anything about the Civil Law, as it
is illustrated by the private law of Quebec, I must remind you
that Quebec, like Prince Edward Island and my own Province of
Nova Scotia, are constituent units in a federal state. Under
*G. V. V. Nicholls, Q.C., Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Dalhousie
University. The lecture was given on October 22, 1973, to a group of
undergraduate students, particularly in political science, at the University
of Prince Edward Island in Charlottetown. The course in which the lecture
was given is an interesting experiment in introducing students to some of
the fundamental ideas of law. It is being encouraged, and where possible
assisted by lecturers from the Faculty of Law at Dalhousie University.
This particular lecture in turn derived a good deal from some
introductory lectures given by Professor Nicholls in a course begun at the
Dalhousie Law School in 1967-68 under the name, "Aspects of Quebec
Law", now "Introduction to the Private Law of Quebec". Deliberately,
the course has never been described as Comparative Law, which would
certainly in this case be a pretentious label. It is a half-year elective open
to students in the Second and Third Years and at the moment is given in
the autumn term with a written examination. Welcome assistance has been
given on aspects of the course by lecturers from the Province of Quebec. It
is not the best-attended elective offered by the Dalhousie Law School.
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section 91 of the British North America Act of 1867 "Laws for
the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada" are federal
laws and common throughout the country, to Quebec as well as
the Common-law provinces. More specifically, "The Regulation
of Trade and Commerce", for example, "Navigation and
Shipping", "Fisheries", "Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Notes", "Bankruptcy", "Patents" and, most important of all
perhaps, "The Criminal Law" are regulated by Dominion
legislation so that the laws governing those subjects are the same
in Quebec as in the other provinces. More often than not the
origins of these laws are to be found in English rather than
French models.
For this, and some other reasons too, it is misleading to
generalize about Quebec, which is often done, and speak of it as
a Civil-law province. Another example to illustrate the error is
that the public as opposed to the private law of Quebec is
English not French. It may not be easy to distinguish clearly
between public and private law, but I should say that, as a
beginning, the laws governing the administration of justice are
public laws. Laws are administered in the name of the Crown
and when what is now Quebec was finally ceded to Britain by
the Treaty of Paris in 1763 there was of course a transfer of
sovereignty. The law was now to be administered in the name
not of the French, but of the British Crown, which no doubt
explains why the courts in Quebec are more like British than
French courts, following practices and procedures closer to
those of Britain than of France. So too with the organization of
the judiciary and, on the whole, the legal profession.
In what respects, then, is it correct to describe Quebec as a
Civil-law Province? To return for a moment to the British North
America Act, the law of the province of Quebec may differ
from that of the other provinces only on "Property and Civil
Rights in the Province", "Generally all Matters of a merely local
or private Nature in the Province" and on those other subjects
specified in the act, mainly in section 92. Quebec is
constitutionally free, like all the provinces, to adopt its own,
speaking loosely, "private law". In this restricted, though
admittedly very important area, it is a Civil-law province. Its law
of property, by way of example, of successions and wills, of
contracts including sale, lease and hire, loan and partnership, of
what Quebec calls "delicts and quasi-delicts" but we call "torts"
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is derived generally from the law of France and through it can
be traced back to origins principally in the Roman law or the
early "customs" of the Germanic tribes. Regarded as a whole,
though, one would have to say that the law of Quebec is a
hybrid.
Another indication of the hybrid nature of Quebec law is
the fact that a few provisions of the Quebec Civil Code, not
many, have been borrowed directly from English law. It is thus,
for example, with article 984, which lays down four requisites
for the validity of contracts, one of them being "A lawful cause
or consideration", the term "consideration" quite unknown to
the Civil Law; and with article 1206, which provides that where
the Code contains no provision for the proof of facts in
commercial matters, the rules of evidence laid down by the laws
of England govern. One of the most interesting provisions of
this sort is article 851, which permits in addition to the notarial,
holograph and military wills recognized by the Civil Law a
fourth category called by the article "wills made in the form
derived from the laws of England", a will signed by the testator
in the presence of at least two competent witnesses. The
recognition of the "English will" in Quebec goes back at least as
far as the Quebec Act of 1774, which in its tenth section
permitted the making of wills "either according to the laws of
Canada, or according to the forms prescribed by the laws of
England".
The Civil Law, whether in France, Quebec or any of the many
other areas to which its principles have been exported, is marked by system, logic, method. The Civilian likes to talk about the
ratio legis, the "reasoning of the law", which seems to imply a
sanguine belief on his part that all the world's ills can be solved
by the application of human reason. The Civilian may be more
likely than the Common lawyer to argue to his conclusion from
analogies, less likely to isolate problems and their answers in
self-contained compartments. On the other hand, the civil-law
lawyer, it is probably not unfair to suggest, is less concerned
with the day-to-day experience of settling disputes as they arise
in practice; he is certainly less court-oriented. His reasoning
tends to be conceptual, to proceed by deduction from general
principles, rather than inductively like that of the more practic-

The Civil Law of Quebec: Some Disjointed Notes for a Lecture 339

ally minded Common lawyer from the particular incident. If
you like alliteration, the Civilian prefers principles to precedents, the Common lawyer precedents to principles. So too of
the French-speaking layman in Quebec and his mother country
of France. We English-speaking Canadians will never understand
Quebecers unless we grasp this difference.
Only a quick glance at the Civil Code of the Province of
Quebec should demonstrate the truth of what I have just been
trying to say. Look at the table of contents at the beginning of
the volume, divided into "Books" - "Of Persons", "Of
Property .

.

.", "Of the Acquisition and Exercise of Rights of

Property", "Commercial Law" - and then each Book into
"Titles", and each Title into "Chapters", and each Chapter into
"Articles", sometimes into "Sections" and "Articles". How
systematic, logical, methodical the arrangement is.
If you go further and examine a few particular provisions
of the Quebec Code, or its ancestor the Code Napoleon, you
will see illustrated the Gallic predilection for principle,
generality, abstraction. Although the Quebec Code does have
regulatory provisions as specific as any section of an Englishman's statute - for example, article 115 ("A man cannot
contract marriage before the full age of fourteen years, nor a
woman before the full age of twelve years.") or article 227 ("A
child born after the three hundredth day from the dissolution
of the marriage is held not to be issue thereof and is
illegitimate.") or article 841 ("Two or more persons cannot
make a will by one and the same act, whether in favor of third
persons or in favor of one another.") - the characteristic
provisions of the Code are more generally phrased, more
abstractly, for example:
article 13, "No one can by private agreement validly contravene the
laws of public order and good morals";
article 173, "Husband and wife mutually owe each other fidelity,
succor and assistance";
article 406, "Ownership is the right of enjoying and of disposing of
things in the most absolute manner, provided that no use be made of
them which is prohibited by law or by regulation";
article 1053, "Every person capable of discerning right from wrong
is responsible for the damage caused by his fault to another, whether
by positive act, imprudence, neglect or want of skill";
article 1072, "The debtor is not liable to pay damages when the
inexecution of the obligation is caused by a fortuitous event, or by
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irresistible force, without any fault on his part, unless he has obliged
himself thereunto by the special terms of the contract";
article 1650, "If the lease [of a farm or rural estate] be for one year
only, and, during the year, the harvest be wholly or in great part lost
by a fortuitous event or by irresistible force, the lessee is discharged
from his obligation for the rent in proportion to such loss";
article 1830, "It is essential to the contract of partnership that it
should be for the common profit of the partners, each of whom
must contribute to it property, credit, skill, or industry";
article 2192, "Possession is the detention or enjoyment of a thing or
of a right which a person holds or exercises himself, or which is held
or exercised in his name by another".

It is almost a commonplace, but nevertheless true, that every
civilized system of law aims at achieving two objectives, which
may sometimes be inconsistent: certainty and flexibility.
"Certainty" is desirable because everyone should know in
advance, or be able to discover, how the law will affect him if
he acts or fails to act in a given way; and "Flexibility", because
the law should have the capacity to adjust to meet the changing
needs of the society it serves or the exceptional case that arises.
For example, the ancient Hebraic rule of "Life for life, Eye for
eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, Burning for
burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe" would hardly be
an acceptable guide for this third quarter of the twentieth
century.
These, then, are the twin aims of both the Civil Law of
Quebec and the Common Law of the other provinces. The
interesting thing is, though, that they tend to reach their ends
by different routes. At the risk of over-simplification, the
Common Law tends to seek certainty through the application
of its doctrine of stare decisis, the binding force of precedent,
to the decisions of courts of law; it may be that increasingly all
the provinces are turning to statutes as a means of declaring the
law but the "residual" law of the provinces other than Quebec
is still the Common Law, the "unwritten law" as declared by
the courts, which acknowledge as binding on them previous
decisions of courts higher in the hierarchy than themselves.
Common-law courts do make law.
Generally speaking, the principle of stare decisis is not
recognized in France - for one thing to do so would be to
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acknowledge that the judges make law, which would be too
great a departure from the separation of powers doctrine for
Old France - nor is it accepted in the New France of Quebec.
Perhaps a Quebec court will acknowledge that it must follow
what is called an "established jurisprudence" - a line of cases
that over the years has consistently held the same thing - but it
does not concede that it must follow the single decision of a
higher court, however wrong it thinks the decision is (lower
courts in Quebec, it has been argued by some, ought to be
prepared to follow a decision of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council, when appeals still lay to it, or a decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada, now the highest court in the
country).
The certainty that is acknowledged to be a desirable aim of
law is looked for in France and Quebec in a code, or codes, a
code that traditionally is interpreted, even supplemented, by
legal writers other than judges. It may be true that increasingly
civil-law countries are referring to decisions of the courts to
assist them in discovering what the law is, but there the
"residual" law remains in theory "The Code" supplemented by
the authors. The French go to the Code and the authors when
all else fails, whereas, when everything else fails, the English
turn to their courts. The works of the authors the French conveniently call la doctrine, whereas the case law they speak of as
la jurisprudence, to the former of which, unlike the English,
they give priority.
The two threads of code and doctrine are interwoven in
the history of the Civil Law. Both make law, the code first and
then the authors, but perhaps the writers should be mentioned
first here because, as it has always seemed to me, they are an
even more characteristic feature than the codes. Circulating
among the class are the two volumes on Obligations from the
published works of Pothier - Joseph Robert Pothier - the
judge, teacher and above all writer on the law who lived in
Orleans, south and slightly west of Paris, in the eighteenth
century. Pothier lived at a time when judicial offices could be
purchased and in certain circumstances inherited. He belonged
to une famille de robe and succeeded his father as a judge when
he was only twenty-one, remaining in the post for fifty-two
years. It is as a writer on the law, though, that he is still
remembered. In middle age he was appointed a professor at the
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University of Orleans and is reported to have said that he
wrote his books for his students. Perhaps it is so, for he writes
with supreme clarity, and most students like clarity. Pothier is
still cited as an authority by judges and lawyers in Quebec.
The civil-law tradition of legal writing goes back in an
almost unbroken line from the present day to Roman times,
interrupted only, if even then, by the so-called Dark Ages from
the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West in 476 A.D. to
the "reception" of the Roman Law again early in the 12th
century. Without apology I assert that an educated man or
woman should know at least the names of some of the deities in
the pantheon of the Civil Law. Here are the five who are
perhaps best known from the Roman law: Papinian, Paul,
Ulpian, Modestinus and Gaius. They are the five singled out by
the extraordinary Law of Citations in A.D. 426 to have special
authority in the Eastern Empire. Where the law was uncertain
and there was conflict of opinion among these five authors, the
judge was instructed to follow the opinion of the majority; if
opinions were evenly divided on the question but Papinian had
pronounced, his view was to prevail; only if Papinian was silent
and the remaining authors evenly divided was the judge
authorized to decide for himself. Contrast this extraordinary
method of settling disputes by a counting of noses with what
the Civilian would regard as the equally extraordinary practice,
followed by many judges in England and the common-law
provinces until recently, if not still, of discouraging the citation,
the mentioning, of writers by counsel and, of course, never
citing a writer themselves: a practice that sometimes has taken
the form of suggesting that no one but a writer who has held or
holds judicial office should be cited; sometimes that living
authors should not be cited, apparently on the basis of some
such rationalization as that a writer might always change his
mind so long as he was alive; and sometimes that legal
periodicals are somehow less worthy of attention than bound
books. Neither system of law has a monopoly of stupidity.
The concept of codification can be traced back on the
continent of Europe as far as the doctrine, or almost as far more than fifteen hundred years. In this lecture we need not
concern ourselves with anything older than the Corpus juris
civilis of the Emperor Justinian, compiled at Byzantium, later
called Constantinople and now Istanbul. The most important of
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the four parts of the Corpusjuris is the Digest, or Pandects, and
it was completed in the extraordinarily short period of three
years from 530 to 533 A.D. It is a freely edited collection of
excerpts from thirty-nine earlier writers on the Roman law
arranged in some sort of rough order, but hardly systematically.
Possibly by modern standards the Digest ought not,
strictly speaking, to be called a code at all. On the other hand, it
was in writing like a code, not "unwritten" in the sense of the
Common Law. Like a modern code, it received its binding
authority from legislation, in the case of the Digest from the
Emperor. And, like a code, it purported to consolidate in one
place all the law in force at the time over a wide field; indeed
Justinian had the temerity to forbid further commentaries on
the passages in the Digest, an attempt that was almost inevitably
doomed to failure, for the doctrinal writers went to work almost immediately. Finally, Justinian's commissioners did make
some attempt to improve, to reform, the existing law.
In the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries the doctrine
flourished in France, as indeed it does to this day. Roman law,
even after its reception at the beginning of the 12th century,
was never applied to the same degree in the northern part of
France as it was in the southern, in what has somewhat
misleadingly been called the pays de droit coutumier to the
same degree as in the pays de droit crit, but there were doctrinal writers in both, sometimes writing on the Roman law,
sometimes on the customary law, and sometimes on both: on
the Roman law for example, to continue the name dropping,
Cujas (1522-1590) and Domat (1625-1695); on the customary
law, Dumoulin (1500-1566) and D'Argentr6 (1519-1590); all
culminating in the master of both systems, to whom I have
already referred, Pothier. Not so many years after his death,
Pothier's works were to become most influential sources in the
drafting of the Code Napolhon of 1804, which in turn was to be
the model for the Civil Code of Lower Canada of 1866.
Scholars like these, not to mention later ones like Aubry
et Rau, F. Laurent, G. Baudry-Lacantinerie, Marcel Planiol,
Georges Ripert, Henri Capitant, Ren6 Savatier, the Mazeauds,
Jean Carbonnier, and so on and so on, probably enjoy a prestige
in France at least as high as that of judges of the highest courts,
the Cour de Cassation and the Conseil d'Etat. Influenced partly
by attitudes in neighbouring provinces, Quebec can hardly be
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said to regard its legal writers quite as highly, though there have
been, and are, some distinguished ones.
It may be thought that the prevalence of customary law in
the northern half of France up to the Revolution at the end of
the 18th century suggests something less than enthusiasm for
codification, but the fact is quite the opposite I think. The
coutumes, of which it is reckoned there were sixty major ones
and something like 300 local ones in France at the time of the
Revolution, admittedly had their origins in unwritten customs
of the Germanic tribes, as the term coutume, custom, implies,
but under royal prodding from the early sixteenth century they
were progressively reduced to writing, to "codes" in spite of the
name. The Custom of Paris, for example, had been reduced to
writing by 1510 and revised by 1580, so that by the Cession of
New France to Britain it had been in codified form for almost
200 years. True, the Custom of Paris did not cover the whole of
the private law - it did not deal with the law of Obligations, for
example, including contracts or delictual responsibility, and
there were other important omissions - but my point is that
the inhabitants of France, Old and New, from whatever part of
the country they came, were thoroughly familiar with codes,
and the techniques of using them, long before what is now
Quebec had been ceded to Britain.
The time may now have arrived to say a little about the law in
force in New France before the surrender of Quebec and
Montreal in 1759-1760 and the final cession of the country
(much more extensive by the way than the present province of
Quebec) to the British Crown by the Treaty of Paris in 1763.
Very briefly, that law was the Custom of Paris, or at least the
part of it regarded as appropriate to the colony, which from
1663 had been formally in force. Also in force were edicts and
at least some of the royal ordinances of Louis XIV and Louis
XV and judgments of the King's Council, together with ordinances and other regulations of the administrative authorities
in the colony and the judgments of the local courts. The French
authors, so far as their works were available, must also have
been used.
After the Conquest, and even for some years following the
Treaty of Paris, much uncertainity existed about the system of

The Civil Law of Quebec: Some Disjointed Notes for a Lecture 345

law, whether English or French, to prevail in Britain's new
colony. The matter was settled by the Quebec Act of 1774, an
Imperial statute, which provided that "in all matters of
controversy, relative to property and civil rights, resort shall be
had to the laws of Canada, as the rule for the decision of the
same". As to the criminal law, the act went on that "whereas
the certainty and lenity of the criminal law of England, and the
benefits and advantages resulting from the use of it, have been
sensibly felt by the inhabitants, from an experience of more
than nine years, during which it has been uniformly administered, . . . the same shall continue to be administered, and shall be

observed as law in the province of Quebec, as well in the
description and quality of the offence, as in the method of
prosecution and trial". So the position was much the same
under the Quebec Act as it now is under the British North
America Act.
By the 1850's the complexity and uncertainty of the law,
partly the result of the diversity of sources, had grown very
great in Quebec, which in 1791 had been separated from what is
now Ontario, and then reunited again, at least partially. In 1857
an act of the united province of Canada provided for the
codification of the laws of Lower Canada "upon the same
general plan" and with "the like amount of detail" as the Code
Civil in France. The Commissioners appointed to the task were
to reduce into one code the laws "which relate to Civil Matters
and are of a general and permanent character, whether they relate to Commercial Cases or to those of any other nature".
They were further instructed to "embody therein such provisions only as they shall hold to be then actually in force, and
they shall give the authorities on which they believe them to be
so; they may suggest such amendments as they shall think desirable, but shall state such amendments separately and distinctly, with the reasons on which they are founded". The code
came into effect in 1866.

Why does the Common lawyer when faced with a legal problem
tend to turn first for a solution to his cases, and the Civilian to
his code and the authors? Perhaps the only explanation is to be
found in the accidents of history. A basic tenet of the policy of
William the Conqueror, a strong administrator, and most of his
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Norman successors was the unification of the country under a
centralized authority. No doubt the administration of justice
was consciously used by them to further this policy at the
expense of the various local courts, like the courts of the
county and the hundred and the manorial courts. At first the
royal justice was presumably dispensed by the King himself and
his immediate advisers as he travelled constantly about the
kingdom. Later it came to be administered by royal justices
whose headquarters were at Westminster but who went out on
regular circuit to the assize towns. In some such way as this the
Common Law was formed, the law common to the whole
kingdom.
The contrast with France is striking. In spite of the
unifying influence of the Roman law, the impact of which was
much greater in France, especially in the southern part, than in
Britain, there was little uniformity in the law of different parts
of France until the French Revolution. The monarch was
always weaker and the feudal lords more powerful in France.
The coutumes and the provincial parlements, jealous of their
prerogatives (incidentally they were courts rather than legislatures), were influences working towards fragmentation, legally
speaking as well as politically. Voltaire's often-quoted remark
that the traveller in France changed his law as often as he
changed his horse had an element of truth as well as hyperbole.
In these circumstances it is consistent with his history that the
Common lawyer should look to the courts for his solutions; the
Civilian instinctively turns elsewhere.
Of course there have been articulate apostles of codification in common-law countries too, but I wonder whether they
are right, right if what is meant by "codification" is the kind of
thoroughgoing summation of all the law in a wide area that is
represented by the Civil Codes of France and Quebec. Statutes
codifying the law on some narrower subject like the federal Bills
of Exchange Act, or the provincial Sale of Goods Acts, or the
uniform acts drafted by the Conference of the Commissioners
on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada are another matter. But
the instinct of most Common lawyers that makes them
indifferent, if not opposed, to any codification on a broader
scale seems to me to be sound. Codification on this level can
never be made to work in the absence of the conditions for its
success that are present in the countries where it has flourished,
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notably an active fraternity of authors whose words will be
listened to with respect by men of affairs, and the absence of
any strict doctrine of binding precedent.
Codes, like the Common Law, have their advantages and
disadvantages. An advantage, though perhaps one that becomes
less obvious as the code grows older, must be that it gathers
together under one cover all the mass of laws, whether statute,
doctrinal or case, on the subject matter it deals with, and into
the mass introduces some order. I think, by way of contrast, of
the description by a distinguished contemporary lawyer in
England of his law as "a welter of confusion", thus echoing
Tennyson's lines of a century ago:
"Mastering the lawless science of our law,
That codeless myriad of precedent,
That wilderness of single instances,
Thro' which a few, by wit or fortune led,
May beat a pathway out to wealth and fame."
Convenience of use is the characteristic that makes codes
popular with ordinary people and law students, if not with
lawyers, who as a race tend to be conservative.
On the other hand, the criticism is often directed against
codes by lawyers trained in the Common Law that a code
attempts artificially to squeeze the law into a formal and rigid
framework, a characteristic that is particularly unfortunate at a
time of rapid social change. A code, it is said, is drafted at a
particular moment of history and so reflects inevitably the
attitudes of its period - in the case of the French and Quebec
codes, an approach, for example, of Christian individualism.
Unquestionably, once they are given the force of law, codes are
difficult to alter. But then what is to be said of an outmoded
rule of the Common Law under a regime of binding precedents?
Weighed in the scales of the Blind Goddess of Justice, which
system has the advantage here?
Much of this lecture has been concerned with the first of the
twin objectives of civilized legal systems, Certainty, about
which it is easier to find tangible things to say than about the
second, Flexibility. About this I have a few remaining things to
add now. Both the Civil- and Common-law systems have evolved
methods of permitting development to meet new social condi-
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tions or the exceptional case, on the whole more openly, it has
always seemed to me, with less pretence, in the former than in
the latter. The deliberate generality of many articles in the
French and Quebec Civil Codes, some examples of which I mentioned earlier, give doctrinal writers and courts a freedom that is
inhibited by stare decisis in England and the Common-law provinces. Here, or so it seems to me, a court anxious to meet the
challenge of new needs is often reduced to the subterfuges of
"fiction" and "distinguishing". When a Common lawyer suggests that once a system of law is codified it becomes immutable, he betrays an ignorance of the nature of a code as the
Civilian understands it. The Quebec Civil Code receives its authority from the legislature, and in that respect is a statute, but
it is dealt with much more flexibly than the typical statute to
which the English Canadian is accustomed. The generality of a
code may be deceptive in its simplicity but it is preferable to
the hypocrisy of the alternative.
Both the Civil and Common Laws of course can always be
amended by the legislature to meet changing needs. It has been
estimated that about a quarter of the approximately 2,300
articles of the Code Napoleon have been amended since 1804.
I do not know how many amendments have been made since
1866 to the roughly equal number of articles in the Quebec
Code, but they have not been negligible. The adoption of a code
therefore does not crystallize the law for all time. Revision of a
whole code, or a substantial part of it, is naturally more
difficult than piecemeal amendment, but even here the attempt
is being made in Quebec. By a provincial statute of 1955, a very
brief statute but a promising one, the Lieutenant-Governor in
Council was authorized to entrust "a jurist" with the task of
revising the Civil Code. After a false start or two, the work of
the Civil Code Revision Office has, in the last six or seven years,
resulted in significant reforms, for example, in the title on
marriage and the title on marriage covenants and the effect of
marriage on the property of the consorts. The work of revision
proceeds.

